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In Courts We Trust?
Abstract: After the fall of authoritarian communist regimes and emergence of constitutional governments, 
constitutional review systems were designed in Central and Eastern Europe. Post-communist systems mostly 
followed the French and German models of abstract and concentrated review, with courts’ powers stemming from 
the Constitution and determined by the legislator. How can constitutional courts limit governmental power, and to 
what degree can they resist political attempts to alter their competence–these are the questions to which answer are 
sought referencing two recent Hungarian and Romanian constitutional court decisions. The two courts had to face 
different challenges and go down different paths–signifi cantly departing even from their respective “traditional” 
stances–and they both arrived at controversial fi ndings. This paper argues that it has not been primarily a problem 
of constitutional design, but rather contextual factors that have amplifi ed the weaknesses of the system and 
consequently led to growing disenchantment and diminishing trust in the guardians of constitution.
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This paper analyzes political attempts to limit constitutional review powers citing examples 
from Romania and Hungary, where the constitutional courts were recently faced with 
legislative attempts to restrict their jurisdiction. The main argument is that the courts’ 
incapacity to offer unequivocal answers to these challenges is not due as much to systemic 
shortcomings, but rather contextual factors. However, this does not help the cause of 
constitutional adjudication, because disenchantment grows, and public trust diminishes in 
the guardians of the constitution.
It took the horrors of World War II, as well as the excesses of unconstrained 
governments, to engender in continental legal theory the idea of enforceable, rights-setting, 
legal constitutions, which also led to the emergence of powerful constitutional courts, such 
as the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. After the fall of 
authoritarian communist regimes and establishment of constitutional governments, the 
adoption of a constitutional review system was already an obvious consequence in Central 
and Eastern Europe. It was also a somewhat natural development, that post-communist 
systems mostly followed the French and German models of abstract and concentrated 
review. 
Unlike the case of the Supreme Court of the United States, which practically carved 
out federal courts’ power to interpret the Constitution and impose their interpretation upon 
the legislator, even if such powers were never expressly conferred by the Constitution,1 
post-communist constitutional courts’ powers stemmed from the Constitution and were 
determined by the legislator.
Under these circumstances, it is fascinating to see whether, how, and to what extent 
constitutional courts can resist political attempts to alter their established competence.
* LL.M, S.J.D., Assistant Professor at the University of Arst Tg. Mures, 547215 Ernei, jud. 
Mures, nr. 799, Romania. 
E-mail: csongi@excite.com
1 In Chief Justice Marshall’s famous words: “It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the 
judicial department, to say what the law is.” Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137(1803).
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In two very recent cases, the Hungarian and Romanian constitutional courts had to 
deal with legislative attempts to limit their powers. 
In Romania, attempts to limit the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction were made 
through two bills2 and an emergency ordinance,3 which aimed to restrict the Court’s review 
powers to those acts of Parliament, which have either a normative character, or affect 
constitutional values, rules or principles. 
In Hungary, the Constitutional Court’s review powers were limited to constitutional 
amendments as well as modifi cations to the law with respect to the Constitutional Court,4 so 
as to restrict scrutiny on certain taxation and state budgetary matters in respect of only those 
situations where fundamental human rights are infringed.
1. 
It must be noted that the Romanian Constitutional Court has the power to adjudicate ex-
ante with respect to the constitutionality of laws. This is not an unknown practice in Europe, 
for instance the French, Portuguese, – and in certain circumstances – Hungarian and Polish 
constitutions also create the possibility of reviewing the constitutionality of laws before 
their entry into force.
As constitutional scholars observed: the ex-ante approach might bring stability to the 
legal system, strengthening the law and protecting it from future challenges. However, 
when ex-post review is also made possible within the same system, the stability-feature 
diminishes, and the ex-ante review becomes more or less a political tool for obstructing the 
legislative procedure.5 Interestingly, even though the Court recently came under severe 
criticism, being depicted as intensely politicized and unable to transcend political disputes,6, 7 
the problematic coexistence of ex-post and ex-ante review was not really questioned. 
However, a commission for the analysis of the political and constitutional regime, set up by 
the Presidency, came up with an exciting proposal, recommending a possible solution for 
the rationalization of constitutional justice. The commission envisaged a system of dual 
competence, in which the Constitutional Court retains the power to adjudicate ex-ante, 
while regular courts exercise ex-post review powers over the constitutionality of laws.8
2 PL-x nr. 134/2012, available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=12702 
PL-x nr. 283/2012 available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=12794 
3 Emergency Ordinance no. 38/2012, Offi cial Gazette no. 445/2012.
4 Law CXIX of 2010 for the modifi cation of Law XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the 
Hungarian Republic. Law CXX of 2010 for the modifi cation of Law XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court.
5 Sadurski, W.: Constitutional Review in Europe and in the United States: Infl uences, Paradoxes 
and Convergences. Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, (2011) 11/15, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1754209
6 I will return to this aspect later on.
7 Gilia, C.: Curtea Constitutionala sub imperiul reformei. Sfera Politicii, (2012) 6, 23–25 and 
Perju, V.: A sosit timpul pentru reformarea Curtii Constitutionale? available at: http://www.
contributors.ro/idei-si-solutii/a-sosit-timpul-pentru-reformarea-curtii-constitutionale-partea-i 
8 Report of the Presidential Commission for the analysis of the political and constitutional 
regime – To consolidate the rule of law, 2008, available at: http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/
CPARPCR/Raport_CPARPCR.pdf 
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Beyond these, one more specifi c feature of Romanian constitutionalism needs some 
explanation. In this system, Parliament is named as the sole legislative authority of the 
state, albeit the Constitution creates signifi cant exceptions from this rule. 
Firstly, the government9 has the option of engaging its responsibility in respect of a 
program, a political declaration, or a bill. In this case, if the government is not dismissed 
via a vote of no confi dence within three days time, the bill must be considered passed 
(amendments can only be made if accepted by the government), and the political declaration 
or program must be treated as mandatory.10 
Secondly, through the institution of legislative delegation, Parliament can mandate the 
government to enact ordinances within a specifi ed domain and period of time. Parliament 
has the option to impose through the delegation act a subsequent approval procedure for 
these ordinances. 
Thirdly, the government also has the possibility of enacting emergency ordinances, in 
extraordinary and urgent situations, without any parliamentary mandate, but only without 
affecting the domains reserved for constitutional laws, the fundamental institutions of the 
state, constitutional rights, liberties and duties, electoral rights and the regime of 
expropriations. All emergency ordinances must undergo the subsequent parliamentary 
approval procedure.11 Alas, governmental lawmaking via emergency ordinances became a 
common practice, amounting, in the fi rst decade of the new millennium, to 1/3 of the 
number of laws enacted by Parliament.12 Taking into consideration the fact that the most 
important pieces of legislation over the past years, including the Penal Code, the Civil 
Code, the Codes of Penal and Civil Procedure etc., were forced through the legislature by 
engaging in responsible procedure, one might speak about a signifi cant erosion of 
Parliament’s powers, but that issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The scrap over the Court’s jurisdiction started with a bill,13 which revoked the Court’s 
ability to review the non-legislative decisions of the Chamber of Deputies, decisions of the 
Senate, and decisions of the united chambers or Parliament. A number of MP’s lodged an 
unconstitutionality complaint and the case was pending, while the government adopted an 
emergency ordinance,14 on the same issue, restating word by word the contested provisions 
of the above-mentioned bill.
It must be noted that the Court’s jurisdiction over the non-legislative decisions of 
Parliament,15 which created the possibility for the president of each chamber, a parliamentary 
group or a number of at least 50 deputies or 25 senators to challenge the constitutionality of 
such acts has been established only recently, and received immediate criticism, authors 
invoking an unconstitutional encroachment of the Court upon Parliament’s activity, a 
  9 In this paper the term “government” is used as synonym for the executive body.
10 Constitution of Romania, art. 114.
11 Constitution of Romania, art. 115.
12 http://www.cogitus.ro/administratie/prea-multe-ordonante-numarul-initiativelor-legislative-
ale-guvernelor-din-ultimii-10-ani.
13 PL-x nr. 134/2012, for the modifi cation of article 27 paragraph (1) of Law no. 47/1992 on the 
organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court.
14 Emergency Ordinance no. 38/201.2.
15 Law no. 177/2010 on the modifi cation and completion of Law no. 47/1992 on the organization 
and functioning of the Constitutional Court.
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curtailing of Parliament’s autonomy.16 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
question of constitutional review of non-legislative acts of parliament, but it must be 
remarked that it is not an unheard-of practice. For instance, jurisdictional or quasi-
jurisdictional acts of parliament (such as verifi cation of credentials, disciplinary measures 
or matters of parliamentary immunity) can be appealed at the constitutional court in 
Germany, Spain, Austria, Portugal or Slovenia. As to the extent of the internal regulation of 
parliaments, a Belgian court declared admissible an action brought by an MP in order to 
obtain enforcement of such a regulation. Moreover, the constitutional courts’ competence to 
deal with staff-related administrative acts of parliaments is also recognized in several 
jurisdictions.17 Regardless of the above discussed however, the attempt to restrict the 
Constitutional Court’s review powers, and the Court’s ability to react to such attempts is at 
the heart of this paper.
The Court struck down the bill in question,18 but this obviously had no effect on the 
validity of the emergency ordinance.19 According to the above described approval 
procedure, another bill was adopted by the legislature20 for the modifi cation and approval of 
the emergency ordinance. The passages in concern were modifi ed, affi rming the Court’s 
jurisdiction over those decisions of Parliament, which had either a normative character, or 
affected constitutional values, rules and principles, with the exception of decisions regarding 
Parliament’s internal autonomy, as well as those decisions of an individual nature. This bill 
also came under constitutional scrutiny upon the complaint of a number of MP’s.
In its fi rst decision,21 the Court stressed that such a limitation of its powers rested not 
on the rule of law, which is the fundament of constitutional justice, but rather on 
considerations of opportunity. Even if art. 146 section l) of the Constitution leaves wide 
open the question of the Court’s jurisdiction, by stating that it also fulfi ls other attributions 
established by the law on the functioning of the Constitutional Court, this can be interpreted 
exclusively as an opportunity given to the legislature to enhance, and by no means limit the 
Court’s competence.
It must also be noted, that in an earlier decision, the Court even recommended the 
abrogation of this controversial provision from the Constitution’s text. The Court invoked 
16 Vedinas, V.: Cateva consideratii privind neconstitutionalitatea legii nr. 177/2010, adoptata de 
Senat la 24 august 2010. Revista de Drept Public, (2010) 3. 104.
17 Veys, M (2008): Analysis of the ECPRD correspondents’ replies. In: Igot, N.–Rezsohazy, 
A.–Van Der Hulst, M.: Parliament & Judiciary. ECPRD Seminar, Belgian House of Representatives 
and the Belgian Senate. 2008, 223–233. available at: http://www.agora-parl.org/sites/default/fi les/
ECPRD_UK.pdf 
18 Decision no. 727 of July 9, 2012.
19 As a telltale of the constitutional tangle caused by the overlap of legislative and executive 
lawmaking, it has to be remarked, that on the very same day that it found the fi rst bill unconstitutional, 
the Court ruled upon two complaints lodged against decisions of the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate to revoke their presidents. Awkwardly enough, the Court found that it had no jurisdiction to 
rule upon the decisions of revocation. The argument rested on the fact that even if the bill that altered 
its jurisdiction and excluded from its competence non-legislative decisions of Parliament was found 
unconstitutional, the emergency ordinance, with the same content was still in force, therefore, “in 
order to maintain a state of constitutionality”, it had to reject the complaints. Decisions no. 728 and 
729 of July 9, 2012.
20 PL-x nr. 283/2012
21 Decision no. 727 of July 9, 2012.
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the fact that this provision created the possibility for the legislator to modify (expand) at 
will the Court’s jurisdiction, adding “legal” attributions to its “constitutional” ones. 
According to the majority opinion, abrogation of this provision could guarantee the Court’s 
independence and preserve the constituent power’s original will, regarding the Court’s 
jurisdiction.22
In the second decision,23 arguments relating to the scope of art. 146 section l) were 
restated, the Court emphasizing that the legislator’s ability to limit the Court’s jurisdiction 
empties the constitutional norm and hijacks it from its original scope (i.e. perfection of 
constitutional democracy). Moreover, it was argued that legislative provisions defi ning the 
Court’s jurisdiction24 had acquired a constitutional status,25 and therefore could not be 
altered by subsequent legislation. Alas, this idea is venturing on very shaky ground, and 
cannot logically explain, why subsequently expanding the Court’s jurisdiction is deemed 
acceptable whilst its limitation is rejected, since both constitute an altering of the original 
“special status” norm. Here, the Court seriously departs from the traditional continental 
constitutional review, and by referring to the constituent power’s original will and raising 
ordinary legislation to the constitutional level, it comes very close to the US model of 
constitutional review. But within the continental method of reasoning, such an approach 
cannot fi t un-problematically. The Court received a number of critiques for “attributing to 
itself a role of constitutional nature”, inevitably leading to the conclusion that “[this] 
attribution is fundamentally unconstitutional”.26
Furthermore, the Court made citations from its case law in order to stress the 
importance of constitutional control over Parliament’s decisions, arguing that especially 
decisions regarding authorities and institutions with a constitutional rank–due to the 
importance of this domain–need a higher degree of scrutiny.27 Consequently, the power to 
review Parliament’s decisions that concern constitutional values and principles is not merely 
a guarantee of a Constitution’s supremacy, but also a tool that enables the Court ensure the 
separation and equilibrium of powers, and this is the reason why in the former decision, 
attempts to limit the Court’s jurisdiction were considered as infringing upon the principles 
of the rule of law.  
Beyond the substantive analysis, the Court also went on to identify formal arguments 
with respect to the unconstitutionality of the norms under scrutiny.
First of all, art. 115 paragraph (6) of the Constitution states that emergency ordinances 
cannot alter the fundamental institutions of the state,28 and the Court is undoubtedly one of 
these institutions. The reason for such a provision is simple: as it was explained above, the 
government has the ability to issue emergency ordinances without any prior delegation by 
Parliament. By restricting the Court’s jurisdiction, the Government acted outside its 
constitutional powers, and the legal status of a fundamental institution was altered in a way 
22 Decision no. 799 of June 17, 2011, on the legislative proposal for the revision of the 
Constitution of Romania.
23 Decision no. 738 of September 19, 2012.
24 Law no. 47/1992 on the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court.
25 The Court uses the term “valenţă” (valence) in its fi gurative sense: value, signifi cance.
26 Ionescu, C.: Despre atributia Curtii Constitutionale de a examina constitutionalitatea 
hotararilor Camerelor legislative si ale Parlamentului. Curierul Judiciar, (2012) 8. 467.
27 Decisions no. 53 and 54 of January 25, 2011.
28 According to Decision no. 1257 of October 7, 2009, fundamental institutions of the state are 
those enumerated by the Constitution.
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that infringed the above-cited constitutional provisions.29 Furthermore, according to a 
previous decision, an unconstitutional ordinance or emergency ordinance could not be 
validated by Parliament through the approval procedure: a law that approves an 
unconstitutional ordinance or emergency ordinance is itself unconstitutional.30
2.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down a law providing for a special retroactive 
income tax,31 but soon after Parliament passed a constitutional amendment that restricted 
the Court’s jurisdiction, rendering it unable to scrutinize laws similar to the one instituting 
the special tax. 
It must be noted, as an essential difference, that while the Romanian legislature 
modifi ed only the law on the organization and functioning of the constitutional court, the 
Hungarian Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment and a modifi cation of the law of 
the Court.32
The Hungarian Constitutional Court therefore, faced a much tougher dilemma, having 
to decide whether it had the power to decide upon the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendments.33
This challenge was not unprecedented, as the Court already had the opportunity to deal 
with similar questions. Through a previous decision, the Court rejected an application for 
lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, another decision also excluded from scrutiny the 
methodological norms for implementing the amending laws.34 It’s worth noting though that 
László Sólyom, the then acting president of the Constitutional Court admitted that the 
majority of judges did not vindicate the jurisdiction to scrutinize constitutional amendments, 
even if principled arguments could be made for carving out this competence.35 
The majority decision stated that the Constitution did confer upon the Court neither 
explicitly, nor implicitly such a jurisdiction that would enable it to review the substantive 
constitutionality of a constitutional amendment. However, the lack of an express provision 
did not necessarily preclude the review of constitutional amendments. The Supreme Court 
29 Interestingly enough, the Court did not fi nd it necessary to dwell upon the unorthodox 
practice of legislation through (emergency) ordinances, stating merely en-passant that the act under 
scrutiny was at odds with the constitutional reasons that could justify the urgent character of the act, 
constituting, therefore, an abuse.
30 Decision no. 421 of May 9, 2007. It must be noted that according to the original version of 
the Constitution (adopted in 1991), decisions of unconstitutionality in the ex-ante review procedure 
could have been overruled by Parliament, through a qualifi ed majority vote. This provision though, 
was deleted from the 2003, revised, version of the Constitution.
31 Decison AB 184/2010. The tax was aimed at reclaiming 98% of those severance payments 
made to public sector workers that were higher than HUF 2 million.
32 Law no. CXIX of 2010 for the amendment of Law no. XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the 
Hungarian Republic, and Law CXX of 2010 for the amendment of Law no. XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court.
33 It must be noted that Hungary recently adopted a new Constitution (Fundamental Law), 
which has been in force since January 1. 2012.
34 Decisions AB 23/1994 and AB 1260/B/1997.
35 Halmai, G.: Alkotmányos alkotmanysértés (Constitutional breach of constitution). 
Fundamentum, (2011) 2, 81–98.
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of India, in Golak Nath v. State Pujab affi rmed that a constitutional amendment could not 
infringe constitutional rights.36 Even if this position was later refi ned, the Supreme Court 
still held that constitutional amendments may not alter the Constitution’s basic structure.37
The majority decision went on then, to emphasize that the Constitution contained no 
unchangeable provisions that could serve as standards for scrutiny.38 In his dissent, justice 
Bragyova argued to the contrary, maintaining that since the Constitution recognized 
fundamental human rights as inalienable and unalterable, these should be considered as 
unchangeable provisions. Moreover, he also identifi ed as unchangeable provisions the goals 
listed in the preamble, namely the multi-party system, the rule of law, the parliamentary 
democracy and the social market economy. Still, the absence of an eternnal clause did no 
stop the Indian Supreme Court in founding its review power on the basic structure-doctrine. 
Or, even in the presence of such a clause, as is in the case of art. 79 of the German Basic 
Law, the scope of the jurisdiction on constitutional amendments was fundamentally 
construed by the Federal Constitutional Court.39 
In a less-than-consistent manner, the Court went on to identify several perennial 
standards that could be considered as standing above the Constitution and beyond the will 
of the constituent power–on the basis of which constitutional amendments could be 
reviewed–only to conclude that since it had no explicit review powers, it did not have the 
possibility to set up such standards either. The fi rst, of these ultra-constitutional standards 
was “the invisible constitution”, a rather cloudy concept, which was elaborated by the Court 
in its earlier case law, and largely conceived as representing the Court’s coherent system of 
interpreting fundamental constitutional rights.40 Secondly, reference was made to the 
“fundamental values of the Constitution”, as the sum of the core provisions related to the 
rule of law. Thirdly, the “essential core” of the Constitution was identifi ed as those 
fundamental rights – the essential content there of – that can be found in the documents of 
the EU and the Council of Europe. Finally, ius cogens norms of international law, together 
with those international treaties to which Hungary is a party, were also considered to be 
unalterable parts of the Constitution. It must be noted, that some authors invoke 
inconsistency with transnational constitutional principles as a compelling argument for 
striking down constitutional amendments on substantive review.41
In their dissenting opinions, several justices adhered to one the above enumerated 
standards. Arguments have been made for the necessity of establishing jurisdiction over 
those constitutional amendments that are obviously contrary to international obligations of 
prominent importance, without explaining the criteria for establishing prominence. Other 
arguments rested on the “essential core” of the Constitution, which was considered to 
comprise of the rule of law, human rights, the most important electoral principles etc. 
Unfortunately none of the dissenters, who claimed that they had found a standard for 
scrutiny, did actually measure the amendments in question against those standards.
36 L.C. Golak Nath and Others v State of Punjab AIR, 1967 SC 1643.
37 Kesvananda Bharati v Statel of Kerala, 1973 SC 1961.
38 Decision AB 61/2011.
39 Halmai, G.: op. cit.
40 Rooted in Decision AB 239/B/1994
41 Dixon, R.: Transnational Constitutionalism and Unconstitutional Amendments. The 
University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, (2011) 349, 12–15, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1840963
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Finally, even if it was unable to “fi nd” jurisdiction over constitutional amendments, the 
Court considered it necessary to signal its concerns about the amendments. In this context, 
it stated that the existing level of rights protection and its system of safeguards could not be 
reduced, as this would be contrary to the requirements of the rule of law. Moreover, it could 
amount to a serious breach of fundamental constitutional rights, if the constituent power 
introduced in the text of the Constitution those provisions of a law that had previously been 
found unconstitutional by the Court, thereby exempting them it from the Court’s review 
powers.
Albeit this reasoning is in serious contradiction to the arguments used for demonstrating 
a lack of jurisdiction in respect of constitutional amendments. On the one hand, the 
Constitution did not contain any express defi nition of the Court’s right or duty to signal 
such tensions between various provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the 
Constitution offered no standard of scrutiny on the basis of which this signaling competence 
could have been exercised. Consequently, it seems that while the review of constitutional 
amendments could not have been carried out due to the lack of a normative jurisdiction, a 
tension between the amendments and the original text could have been established and 
signaled even in the absence of any such jurisdiction.42
Approaching this issue from a different perspective, other authors emphasize that in 
the absence of any possibilities for enforcement, a frequent use of the signalization attribute 
runs the risk of making the Court imponderable.43 A similar concern was voiced in the 
dissenting opinion of justice Kiss, who argued that signalization is insuffi cient in the case of 
amendments that consciously target immediate political goals, as at most it encourages the 
constituent power to use constitutional amendments to achieve its most important targets.
3.
Lecturing the above decisions, the contrast in their approach appears striking. Both courts 
are civil law courts, fi tting in with the patterns represented by civil law constitutional 
adjudication, but alike their entire respective domestic legal systems, which historically 
followed different civil law traditions, the Hungarian Court is arguably closer in its approach 
to the German Bundesfervassungsgericht, while the Romanian Court appears more related 
to the French Conseil Constitutionnel. Intriguingly, the already mentioned presidential 
commission’s report recommended the Romanian Constitutional Court to shift towards the 
German and, potentially, the South African model of constitutional adjudication.
The Hungarian Court, especially in its early years, was at the forefront of the transition 
process, passing judgments on virtually all the fundamental issues of transition. Hungary 
was rightly described as arena, and “courtocracy”.44 Its expansive Court, constitutionalizing 
the political arena, and attempting to impose an “invisible constitution”, as the ultimate 
standard for shaping the legal order.
42 Halmai: op. cit. 81–98.
43 Drinoczi, T.–Kocsis, M.: A jogalkotási eljárás materiális feltételeiről (About the material 
aspects of the lawmaking procedure). Scientia Iuris, (2012) 1–2, 58–59.
44 Scheppele, K. L.: Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why Courts Can be More Democratic then 
Parliaments. In: Czarnota, A.–Krygier, M.–Sadurski, W. (eds): Rethinking the Rule of Law after 
Communism. CEU Press, (2005), 25–61.
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The Romanian Court did not take away politics from the legislator, but attempted to 
act as a guardian of the rules an arbitrator ensuring that the bounds of lawmaking set by the 
constitution were respected. It must be noted that, until its 2003 revision, the Romanian 
constitution allowed for a legislative overrule of the Court’s decisions taken in the ex-ante 
review procedure.45
The “arbitrator”-approach could arguably be due also to the fact that in the Romanian 
mixed, semi-presidential system institutional confl icts between political bodies are more 
frequent, and must be subjected to the Court’s decision.
However, in the decisions discussed, the courts depart from their traditional stance: the 
Hungarian Court’s main concern became respect for the bounds of lawmaking, while its 
Romanian counterpart walked right through the lawn of politics, asserting jurisdiction over 
Parliament’s decisions. Commentators noted that recently all decisions concerning delicate 
and socially important issues were taken by the Romanian Constitutional Court with a 
minimal, 5 to 4 majority, where the majority was made up of justices appointed by the 
governing power.46 A similar criticism was brought against the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, too, accused of doing away with the ideal of constitutionalism.47 
It would be far-fetched to conclude that the court decisions discussed signal a turn of 
tides: a constitutionalization of the political environment in Romania, and a politicization of 
the constitution in Hungary. The explanation is more likely to rest on the contextual factors. 
As Rosenfeld notes, each system of adjudication has its own weaknesses and problems 
arise when contextual factors exacerbate these weaknesses.48
Intriguingly, while in the case of Germany traditional disenchantment with politics is 
deemed to be an argument for the enhanced legitimacy of the Bundesfervassungsgericht, in 
the arguably at least similarly paternalistic Hungary and Romania, this disenchantment is 
projected over the Constitutional Court, too, which is perceived more as an extension of the 
political environment. In this context, through such fi rm departures from their regular 
approach, the Constitutional Courts of Hungary and Romania are less likely to improve 
their capital of legitimacy.
45 Former art. 145 para. 1 of the Constitution required a 2/3 majority in both chambers of the 
Parliament to override a decision of the Court
46 Gilia: op. cit. 
47 Halmai: op. cit.
48 Rosenfeld, M.: Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and 
Contrast (working paper). International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2 (2004) 4, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=577003
